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Tying Together Termination For Convenience In
Government Contracts
Cases and legal theories surrounding convenience terminations are
found throughout numerous publications. This comment pulls together
and organizes this information into major areas of application and limita-
tions that have arisen as a result of case law and Congressional action.
The author concludes that existing limitations on the use of a convenience
termination are not sufficient to prevent abuse by the government. Thus, it
is up to Congress to implement a more equitable test for determining the
proper applicability of convenience terminations if abuse by the govern-
ment is to be avoided.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a contract has been signed or even after it has been par-
tially executed, the government may terminate it, in whole or in
part, with almost uncontrolled discretion. This sovereign right de-
rives from the termination for convenience' of the government
clause, which is included, expressly or "by operation of law," in
all government contracts over $10,000.00.2 Such a right is contrary
to common law principles governing breach of contract. The con-
tractor can lose anticipatory unearned profits, as well as being
subjected to disruption and material harm to his expected
financial return, revenue, material, equipment, and manpower
planning. A substantial amount of research has discussed the ac-
tual use of the T/C clause and many authorities have suggested
limitations on the government's power to terminate a contract.
The objective of this commentary is to tie together the legal theo-
ries surrounding a convenience termination and to review some
of the existing and proposed limitations on the government's right
as suggested in the literature. 3
1. Hereinafter referred to as T/C.
2. The Termination for Convenience of the Government Clause provides:
"The performance of work under this contract may be terminated by the Govern-
ment in accordance with this clause in whole, or from time to time in part, when-
ever the Contracting Officer shall determine that such termination is in the best
interest of the Government .. " 41 C.F.R.§ 1-8.701, ASPR §§ 8-701(a) and 7-
103.21(a) (1979); 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-21(b), F.P.R. 1-8.201, ASPR § 7-103.21(c) (1966), 32
C.F.R. §§ 7.103-21(c), 8.701(a) (1970). See also NASA-PR 8.701(a) for NASA Con-
tracts.
3. W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL (1979); R. NASH & J.
CIBiNIc, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAw (2d ed. 1969); J. WHELAN & R. PASLEY, CASES
Initially, a brief review of the historical background of the con-
venience termination right will delineate the process by which
the T/C clause became included "by operation of law" in govern-
ment contracts. Some significant examples of the government's
application of the T/C clause will be offered in circumstances
characterized as: partial T/C, constructive T/C, wrongful default
termination, contracts illegally awarded, loss contracts, and buy-
ing elsewhere at a cheaper price. The commentary will then
briefly address the contractor's remedies in a convenience termi-
nation focusing on the relinquishment of anticipatory profits.
This will be followed by a review of some of the current and pro-
posed limitations upon the government's use of the T/C clause.
Likewise, the issue of the validity of the government's use of the
termination and a number of attempted arguments upon the limi-
tation of the government's right will be discussed. The bad faith
limitation approaches will be analyzed in turn. Finally, the abuse
of discretion tort approach, the multiple convenience termina-
tions approach, and the first to file approach will be analyzed in
terms of limiting the govenment's use of the T/C clause.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENIENCE TERMINATIONS
A. Pre- World War I
Administrative requirements that contracts contain a provision
allowing the government to terminate for its own convenience can
be traced back quite far.4 In 1875, in United States v. Corliss
Steam-Engine Co.,5 the Supreme Court held that the capacity to
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1975); Dickson, The Effect of
Government Breach of Contract Prior to Termination for Convenience or Default,
11 NAT'L CONT. MGT. J. 125 (1977-78); Dovnis & Forman, Historical Significance of
Termination of Contracts for the Convenience of the Government, 14 FED. G.J. 191
(1954); Hardee, Termination of Military Contracts, 32 TEx. L. REV. 172 (1953);
Mitchell & Tracy, Terminations of Government Contracts: Recent Developments, 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 817 (1973); Perlman & Goodrich, Termination for Convenience
Settlements -The Government's Limited Payment for Cancellation of Contracts, 10
PUB. CoNT. L.J. 1 (1978); vom Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29
FED. B.J. 305 (1970); Whelan & Pearson, Underlying Values in Government Con-
tracts, 10 J. PUB. L. 298 (1961). See also A. JOSEPH, TERMINATIONS OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS (1978); W. PErrr, Terminations: Default and Convenience, in CONCEN-
TRATED COURSE IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1979); W. PETrIT, Terminations for
Convenience and Default and Government Specification4 in MASTER'S INSTITUTE
(1972); L. VICTORINO, More Contract Clauses, in FUNDAMENTALS OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTING (1979); L. VICTORINO, Terminations, in PROCUREMENT FOR LAWYERS
(1979).
4. For an early requirement of this type, see United States v. Speed, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 77 (1868). The contract in this case was not binding on the United States
because it did not contain a "for termination" clause.
5. 91 U.S. 321 (1875). "With the improvements constantly made in ship-build-
ing and steam-machinery and in arms, some parts originally contracted for may
have to be abandoned, and other parts substituted." Id. at 323.
[Vol. 7: 711, 19801 Termination for Convenience
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
contract necessarily included the capacity to administer contracts
and also the capacity to breach them, when to do so would serve
the public interest. And in the case of Cramp v. United States,6
the Court applied the common law principle that contracting par-
ties may agree in advance to be bound by specific conditions in
government contracts. From these two cases came the govern-
ment's right to terminate a contract for its convenience, with lim-
ited remedies existing for the contractor.
B. World War I
The predominant need to terminate for the convenience of the
government arose during the early part of this century. The en-
tire country was mobilized and heavily involved in the procure-
ment of necessities for World War I. It was soon recognized that
technological and political developments could quickly make the
subject matter of existing contracts obsolete. As a result, there
came a need to terminate contracts at the will of the government.7
In addition, the government was faced with potential stockpiles of
weapons and substantial contractual obligations to buy more.8 In
order to solve these problems, and avoid government waste, Con-
gress included a clause in the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation
Act of 19179 which gave the President the power to "modify, sus-
pend, cancel or requisition any existing or future contracts for the
building, production, or purchase of ships or material."l 0
Under the Act the contract may be terminated by the govern-
ment whenever the President determines such termination to be
in the best interests of the goverment.
C. World War 11
Similar problems faced government procurement officials dur-
ing World War II. The Contract Settlement Act of 194411 became
6. 216 U.S. 494 (1910).
7. vom Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29 FED. B.J. 305, 313
(1970).
8. Id.
9. Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1917, § 2, ch.29, 40 Stat. 182 (1917).
10. Id. See Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Willys Corp., 16 F.2d 859 (3d Cir.
1929), which briefly discusses procedures in force in the War Department during
1918. Discussed in part in the opinion is War Department Supply Circular No. 111
of 1918 dealing with the subject of termination for convenience and clauses to be
used for that purpose.
11. The Contract Settlement Act, § 1, ch. 358, 58 Stat. 649 (1944). Current ver-
effective in July of 1944. It expressly established uniform T/C
procedures and assured speedy and equitable final settlement of
claims under terminated war contracts.12 Termination procedures
remain basically the same today.13
III. THE RIGHT To TERMINATE FOR CONVENIENCE WHERE NOT
EXPRESSLY INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACT
The government, at its convenience, can terminate a contract
for the purchase of supplies when it believes the contract is not in
its best interest, whether or not the contract contains an express
termination clause.' 4 This power evolves from-the government's
inherent sovereign authority.'5 In United States v. Corliss Steam-
Engine Co.,16 the Supreme Court held that the executive Depart-
ment need not have specific statutory authority to include an ex-
press T/C clause in a government contract.'7
With regard to lost profits, the Court in Russell Motor Car Co. v.
United States'8 held that any contract entered into after enact-
ment of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1917, "was en-
tered into with the prospect of its cancellation in view," and
therefore loss of profits was "within the contemplation of the par-
ties."19
In G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States,20 the court held that
a clause providing for termination for the government's con-
venience was to be read into the contract and therefore was in-
cluded by operation of law because "Congress would be loath to
sanction a large contract which did not provide for power to ter-
minate."2 1 Today under the "Christian Doctrine," a T/C clause
sion at 41 U.S.C. §§ 101-25 (1976). This statute relates only to terminated war con-
tracts and therefore has no effect upon contracts not relating to World War I.
12. Id.
13. See Contract Settlement Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 101-25 (1976).
14. 29 Comp. Gen. 36 (1949).
15. United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321, (1875).
16. Id.
17. Dovnis & Forman, Historical Significance of Termination of Contracts for
the Convenience of the Government, 14 FED. B.J. 191 (1954); Hardee, Termination of
Military Contracts, 32 TEx. L. REV. 172 (1953).
18. 261 U.S. 514 (1923).
19. Id. at 524.
20. 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963), a d on rehear-
ing, 320 F.2d 345 (1964). See also Esquire, Inc. v. B.A. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796(D.C.
Cir. 1978).
21. G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d at 426. The contract
failed to include a T/C clause. As a result when the contract was terminated the
contractor sought to recover anticipated profits. It was held that the provision is
required by the ASPR, and therefore had the force and effect of law. Therefore,
the court incorporated as a matter of law the ASPR termination for convenience of
the government articles into the contract. See also Chamberlain Mfg., ASBCA
18103, 74-1 BCA 10368 (1974). The court stated that it would incorporate a termi-
(Vol. 7: 711, 1980] Termination for Convenience
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must be considered included in the contract even though it may
have been inadvertently omitted.22 T/C clauses are now routinely
contained in most government contracts,23 thus, the omission of a
T/C clause, even if deliberate, does not preclude its incorporation
through application of the "Christian Doctrine".
IV. SOME EXAMPLES OF THE GOVERNMENT'S APPLICATION OF THE
TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE CLAUSE
A T/C can come about by written notice from the contracting
officer 24 or by operation of law. Convenience terminations have
been used in a wide variety of situations, including: to avoid a
conflict with the Comptroller General,25 to avoid a dispute with
Congress, 26 to employ a rival contractor with better production fa-
cilities,27 to halt work that was proving to be too difficult or expen-
sive because of defective government specifications,28 to cease
construction of an Anti-Ballistic Missile base,29 and to discontinue
contracts when the South Vietnamese government had col-
lapsed.30
The characteristic case for a convenience termination is ably
nation for convenience clause unless extraordinary circumstances were present.
No such circumstances were found in the case.
22. Steinthal & Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. F.P.R. 1-8.7 now makes the use of a termination clause mandatory for the
agencies subject to the Federal Procurement Regulations. See F.P.R. 1-8.700-2.
24. Where the convenience termination is a result of a written notification, it is
provided by way of a summary telegram. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-8.802.1, ASPR § 8-801.1
(1979) for approved telegraphic notice forms. The telegram is then followed by a
letter more completely describing the actions to be taken 41 C.F.R. § 1-8.801.2,
ASPR § 8-8.801.2 (1979).
25. Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 612 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
Coastal Cargo Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Brown & Son Elec.
Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1963); John Reiner & Co. v. United States,
325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
26. Schlesinger v. United States, 390 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
27. Nesbitt v. United States, 345 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
28. Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
29. An interesting example of the necessity for the power to terminate for con-
venience occurred in conjunction with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT). As a result of those negotiations a multi-million dollar Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile base under construction had to be immediately discontinued under the terms
of the diplomatic agreements reached. The T/C clause provided the Government
with the ability to discontinue the project in an orderly, timely, and effective man-
ner. A. JOSEPH, TERMINATIONS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACT (1978).
30. Han Yang Construction Co., Ltd., 79-2 BCA § 13,951, GOV'T. CONT. REP.
(CCH) § 89,189 (1979). See also Computer Sciences Corp., ASBCA § 22,758, 79-2
BCA 14,022 (1979).
described in Nolan Brothers, Inc. v. United States,31 where the
court stated:
Among the host of variable and unspecified situations calling for closing of
the work under a still-existing contract [citation omitted] it is entirely rea-
sonable to include a post-contract recognition that the job is impossible or
too difficult to perform or too costly for the Government if pushed through
to its conclusion.
3 2
A. Partial Termination For Convenience
There are two primary situations in which a partial convenience
termination may be utilized, as expressed within the meaning of
the clause itself.33 The first is where it is used to cover a deletion
of a portion of the contract. A partial T/C may also be used
where the contracting officer and the contractor had initially pro-
ceeded to negotiate a price reduction under the "changes clause"
where the government desired to delete an item of the contract.34
B. Constructive Termination For Convenience
The termination for convenience, while generally for the gov-
ernment's benefit, does not always leave the contractor without
protection. A "constructive termination for convenience" may oc-
cur where the government, operating under a "requirements con-
tract,"3 5 avoids giving the contractor further orders. 36 This is
considered a constructive termination for convenience "by opera-
tion of law" because the contracting officer could have terminated
31. Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250, 1253 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
32. Id.
33. See note 2, supra.
34. In Frederick Constr. Co. v. United States, ASBCA 12,108, 12,241, 68-1 BCA
6832 (1968), the Board held that "where the government wishes to reduce the
number of units of supplies to be furnished, eliminate an item of work, or other-
wise reduce the quantity of work to be performed, it proceeds properly to this end
under the convenience termination article." See Dairy Sales Corp. v. United
States, 593 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1979), where the court stated "[A]fter the contract
was entered into with plaintiff an error in computing shipping costs was discov-
ered with respect to one of the items, which, when corrected, showed the award of
that item actually should have gone to [another contractor]." The government
subsequently terminated for the convenience of the government most of the item
in the initial contract and awarded that portion to the other contractor. See also
Kisco Co., Inc. v. United States, Gov'T. CoNT. REP. (CCH) § 83,432 (1979).
35. In a "requirements contract," the government agrees to order from the
contractor all of its requirements for the agreed upon contract period. In this type
of situation, once the government's requirements are met, the contract can be can-
celled. See Kalvar Corp., Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Wheeler
Brothers, Inc., ASBCA 2465, 79-1 BCA § 13,642 (1979). The failure of the govern-
ment to order its requirements for automotive parts from a contractor under an
automotive parts requirements contract constituted a constructive partial termina-
tion of the requirements contract which entitled the contractor to an equitable ad-
justment under the T/C clause.
36. Nesbitt v. United States, 345 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
926 (1966). See also Soledad Enterprises, ASBCA 20,376, 77-2 BCA 12,552 (1977).
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for the convenience of the government. 37 Thus, the T/C clause
may be used to grant relief to contractors, based upon the govern-
ment's inaction with these contracts. 38
A constructive T/C can also occur in a case where the con-
tracting officer directs work on the contract to cease and subse-
quently fails to direct the contractor to resume work.3 9 Further, a
constructive termination may be applied in situations when the
government attempts to repudiate a contractual relationship in
which a contractor has been induced to rely, to his detriment, on
the government's former position. An "equitable estoppel"40 may
37. In Nesbitt the court decided that since the government had also reserved
the right to terminate plaintiff's performance, either wholly or partially, the con-
tracting officer could still have satisfied his desire to place some orders elsewhere
by invoking the right of partial termination, "from time to time" if necessary,
under the convenience-termination article. 345 F.2d at 585.
38. In Integrity Management Int'l, Inc., ASBCA 18,789, 75-1 BCA 11,235 (1975),
it was held that the government has the obligation to use due care and take into
account all reasonable available relevant information in establishing the estimates
upon which the bids are to be based. Since the government did not use reason-
able due care in calculating the estimates, the contractor would be entitled to re-
lief based upon a constructive partial termination for convenience. See also Pied
Piper Ice Cream, Inc., ASBCA 20,605, 76-2 BCA 12,148 (1976); Gover Contracting-
Corp., GSBCA 4115, 75-2 BCA 11,550 (1975). In Henry Angelo & Sons, Inc.,
ASBCA 15,082, 72-1 BCA 9356 (1972), the Board held that, where the government
had partially terminated a printing contract on a military base due to lack of
funds, the government had constructively partially terminated the contract for
convenience. See also Inland Container v. United States, 512 F.2d 1073 (Ct. Cl.
1975); Charles Bainbridge, Inc., ASBCA 19,949, 75-2 BCA 11,414 (1975). But see
Maxson Electronics Corp., ASBCA 12,983, 72-2 BCA 9543 (1972).
39. In Harbridge House Inc., PSBCA 264, 77-2 BCA 17,653 (1977), the court
stated:
A contractor [was] entitled to termination costs on an implied in fact con-
tract for professional services because the contracting officer's directions
that work on the contract was to cease due to internal disagreements con-
cerning the type of program to be developed, and the absence of subse-
quent directions to resume work, constituted a constructive termination
for convenience, even though the procedure for termination was not pre-
cisely followed.
Cf. Commercial Cable Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 816 (Ct. Cl. 1968). (A corpora-
tion agreed pursuant to a contract to construct a trans-Atlantic cable. The court
ruled that the corporation could not recover for a breach of contract because of its
failure to show that the breach was caused by a failure of the United States to
render assistance as required by the contract).
40. The following four elements must be present in order to establish an es-
toppel:
1) The party to be estopped must know the facts;
2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that
the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended
3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts, and;
4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
Emeco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 652, 657 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
arise to prevent the government from denying the existence of
the contract.4 1
The termination clause may be used to deny the government
the right to allow a contractual relationship to end through the
mere failure to exercise an option.4 2 In the case of Manloading &
Management Associates, Inc. v. United States,43 the contract con-
tained an option provision allowing for termination in the event
that funds were not appropriated for the project. The contracting
officer, at the pre-bid conference, stated that any prospective bid-
der should be assured that funds are available. Subsequently the
contract was terminated because of the erroneous bid protests of
another contractor, after the plaintiff relied on it to his detri-
ment.4
C. Wrongful Default Termination
The T/C clause may be used in cases of wrongful termination
by the contracting officer.45 The most common example is the sit-
41. Emeco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 652 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
42. Manloading & Management Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1299 (Ct.
Cl. 1972).
43. Id. See also Stevens Mfg. Co. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 720 (Ct. Cl. 1934)
where the court held that the party against whom an equitable estoppel is set up
acquiesced in the transaction in such a manner as to change the relationship of
the parties and make its repudiation of the proceedings contrary to equity and
good conscience.
44. In these factual situations the government is prevented from repudiating a
contractual arrangement because by its action, it acquiesced in a situation in such
a manner as to induce a contractor to detrimentally change his position.
45. In the case of G.C. Casebolt Co. v. United States, 421 F.2d 712 (Ct. Cl. 1970),
the court said:
The rule we have followed is that, where the contract embodies a conven-
ience-termination provision as this one would, a Government directive to
end performance of the work will not be considered a breach but rather a
convenience termination - if it could lawfully come under that clause -
even though the contracting officer wrongly calls it a cancellation, mistak-
enly deems the contract illegal, or erroneously thinks that he can termi-
nate the work on some other ground ... .. The principle underlying these
decisions is that a party to a contract may justify an asserted termination,
rescission, or repudiation, of a contract [which turns out not to be well
grounded] by proving that there was, at the time, and adequate cause, al-
though it did not become known to him until later.
See Schlesinger v. United States, 390 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Coastal Cargo Co. v.
United States, 351 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Nesbitt v. United States, 345 F.2d 583
(Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Warren Bros. Roads Co. v.
United States, 355 F.2d 612 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Brown & Son Elev. Co. v. United States,
325 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1963); John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964). See also Switlik Parachute Co., Inc. v.
United States, 573 F.2d 1228 (1978). However, the dissenting opinion in Switlik
stated that the contractor had a right to an informed and deliberate exercise of
discretion by the government officials involved (in deciding whether to terminate).
There was no evidence that the Government officials ever exercised their discre-
tion or even realized they had any. The "haste" to terminate the contractor for de-
fault was "indecent" under the circumstances of the case. The speed reflects a
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uation of a termination for default, where the default determina-
tion was found to have been improper. In such situations, the
government's act will be treated as a convenience termination.46
D. Contracts Illegally Awarded
A T/C may be applied in such cases where a contract has been
"illegally" 47 awarded in a manner that is not "plainly or palpably
illegal."48 The doctrine of palpable illegality is seriously criticized
by Professor Keyes:
Except to the extent that the government benefits from the past perform-
ance, this practice appears to be questionable because the statutes and
regulations authorized thereunder make no such distinction between a
clear intent to terminate before the contractor knew it was imminent and could
urge anything in its own behalf. The court concluded that the default termination
should be converted into a termination for the government's convenience. 573 F.2d
at 1236-37 (dissenting opinion); Nolan Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250
(Ct. Cl. 1969); College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12 (1925).
46. ASPR 7-103.11(e) provides that, following a termination for default, if it is
determined that the contractor was not in default, the rights of the parties will be
determined as though the termination had been pursuant to the termination for
the convenience of the government clause. [I]f the contract does not contain a
clause providing for termination for convenience ... the contract shall be equita-
bly adjusted." See also: Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 455 F.2d 556 (Ct.
Cl. 1972); National Investigation Bureau, Inc., Dot Cab 78-24, 79-1 BCA § 13,782
(1979). An interesting question has been raised by Professors Whelan and Pasley:
[Ilf the Contractor is clearly in delinquency and the Government entitled
to issue a termination for default. . ., must the Contracting Officer do so
in circumstances where a reasonable man (or a reasonable Comptroller
General) would think that this course was in the 'public interest' [or
might] the Contracting Officer instead decide to issue a Termination for
Convenience' notice?
J. WHELAN AND R. PASLEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACTS 826 n.2 (1975).
47. An "illegal" award results only if it was made contrary to statutory or regu-
latory requirements. W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 55 (1979).
48. Cancellation for illegality and termination for convenience has been dis-
cussed by the Comptroller General as follows:
We are in agreement with the position of the Court of Claims that 'the
binding stamp of nullity' should be imposed only when the illegality of an
award if 'plain'. In determining whether an award is plainly or palpably
illegal, we believe that if the award was made contrary to statutory or reg-
ulatory requirements because of some action or statement by the contrac-
tor or if the contractor was on direct notice that the procedures being
followed were violative of such requirements than the award may be can-
celled without liability to the government except to the extent recovery
may be had on the basis of quantum meruit. On the other hand, if the
contractor did not contribute to the mistake resulting in the award and
was not on direct notice before award that the procedures being followed
were wrong, the award should not be considered plainly or palpably ille-
gal, and the contract may only be terminated for the convenience of the
government.
'plain illegality' and other illegalities. Absent a statute or regulation, the
judiciary and the Comptroller General are legislating with respect to the
disposition of taxpayer funds for purposes not envisioned by the elected
representatives of the taxpayer.
4 9
E. Loss Contracts
The question of using the T/C clause to relieve the contractor
from a "loss contract"5 0 arises when the contractor seeks a "no
cost" convenience termination because the projected cost to com-
plete the contract greatly exceeds the contract price. For exam-
ple, unanticipated double digit inflation has seriously affected
estimated labor and material budgets. In a number of cases, the
GAO has questioned as to whether the T/C clause should be ex-
ercised where the entire purpose is to relieve the contractor from
a loss contract.51 However, terminations for the convenience of
the government are proper to cancel a loss contract if the contrac-
tor's future performance is essential to the national defense.5 2
Terminations on this basis are in the best interest of the govern-
ment. Where the T/C is both beneficial to the contractor and in
the best interests of the government, the convenience termination
is generally approved.53
E. Buying Elsewhere At A Lower Price
In 1963, the Comptroller General was presented with the cir-
cumstances of terminating a contract to take advantage of a lower
bid from another contractor.54 The Comptroller General directed
49. W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL, 56-57 (1979).
50. Id. at 57.
51. A loss contract is one requiring performance according to terms which
would operate to deprive the contractor of any profit from the job and would prob-
ably impose a substantial loss. In re Veterans Administration the Comptroller
General stated that:
A termination of convenience clause is designed for the Government's
benefit and not as a means of relieving contractors from the burdens of
contract performance. It appears to us, however, that the primary reason
for terminating these contracts is to relieve certain contractors from the
increased costs of contract performance . . . we do not recommend in
favor of terminating these contracts.
Gov'T. CoNT. REP. (CCH) § 81,806 (1974). See also In re R.H. Pines Corp., 54 Comp.
Gen. 527 (1974).
52. See Amron Corp., ACAB 1155; Kellet Corp., ACAB 1164; Libby Welding
Co., ACAB 1163.
53. See Scope Electronics, Inc., ASBCA 20,359, 77-1 BCA 12,404 (1977) (the re-
quirements of the contract were not possible of performance). See also Caskel
Forge, Inc., ASBCA 7638, 62 BCA 5318; Arnold H. Leibowitz, GSBCA CCR-1, 76-2
BCA 11,930 (1976).
54. Comp. Gen. B-152,486 (1963) (unpublished opinion).
Therefore, the remaining portion of the contract was cancelled by the De-
partment of the Air Force for the convenience of the Government, and it
appears that such action will result in substantial savings to the Govern-
ment. As it is not apparent from the record that the administrative action
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the contracting officer to terminate the award after finding that
three lower bids had not been properly evaluated from a technical
standpoint. In 1974, the Court of Claims, in Colonial Metals Co. v.
United States,5 5 approved the exercise of the T/C clause to termi-
nate a contract to enable the government to buy elsewhere at a
cheaper price. The far-reaching impact of the Colonial Metals de-
cision is of major concern today to contractors dealing with the
federal government.56 By permitting the government's action, the
was capricious, we will not attempt to substitute our judgment for that of
the contracting agency nor do we perceive any basis upon which we could
object to cancellation for the convenience of the Government when a
lower price is obtainable for a usable product.
55. 494 F.2d 1355 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
In synopsis, Colonial held that the government may terminate a contract for
convenience to attain a lower price for the same goods, even where the availability
of the lower price was known or should have been known to the government at the
time of initial award.
In Colonial the contractor was awarded a contract to furnish copper to the Navy.
Immediately after award he ordered the copper from his supplier to fulfill the ba-
sic contract. Less than one month later the government terminated the contract,
using the termination for convenience clause in the contract. The government
then repurchased the material from another contractor at approximately thirty
percent below the originally contracted price.
Immediately upon termination, plaintiff cancelled its order with his supplier, si-
multaneously replaced the order for contractor's own account, and thereafter sold
the copper for more than it had paid but less than the price in the original contract
with the Navy. In a termination cost proceeding the Board of Contract Appeals
allowed neither profit on the contract with the government nor loss on the contract
with the supplier.
Colonial asserted that the convenience-termination was an act of bad faith be-
cause the government acted in order to obtain elsewhere a better price known at
the time of the award to be available. Citing Christian, the court reasoned that the
T/C clause is designed to provide a mechanism whereby the Government may end
its obligation on a contract. The court said, "the determination of the interest and
convenience of the Government is by the contract's clause left to the discretion of
the contracting officer." Id. at 1360-61.
The court reaffirmed that the contracting officer has the fullest discretion to end
the work in the interest of the government. The conclusion reached was that the
common theme of all these terminations was the obtaining of monetary benefit or
other benefit to the government. The court freely extended this conclusion and
held that a termination to buy elsewhere at a cheaper price is essentially such a
termination. The government's saving of almost "one quarter of a million dollars"
cannot be questioned as being anything but in the best interests of the govern-
ment. Id. at 1361.
The lower ASBCA decision can be found at Colonial Metals Co., ASBCA 15,860,
76-1 BCA 9328 (1972). See also 494 F.2d at 1360.
56. The following cases have cited Colonial as precedent: Kalvar Corp. Inc. v.
United States, 543 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Dr. Javad Hedayaty, ASBCA 22,276 78-1
BCA 13,151 (1978); MSG Assoc., Inc., ASBCA 21,753, 77-2 BCA 12,613 (1977); Elec-
trical Testing Labs, Inc., HUD BCA 76-15, 77-1 BCA 12,466 (1977); Corparra Motor
Serv. Inc., GSBCA 4376, 75-2 BCA 11,518 (1975); Dairy Sales Corp., ASBCA 20,193,
court has impliedly given its approval to other government termi-
nations for convenience where the government successfully ob-
tains a cheaper price from other outside sources.
The General Services Administration, in a 1978 order by the
GSA administrator, said that:
If GSA cannot save the taxpayer money in the procurement of items, we
should not be offering them (to federal agencies) at all. Therefore, I have
directed that any item or class of items obtainable from retail outlets at a
cost lower than that available under GSA's Federal Supply System multi-
ple-award schedules will be discontinued.
5 7
Apparently the GSA intends to halt supply contracts where
cheaper prices exist outside of the contract. Thus the basis of ter-
minations for the convenience of the government, as developed in
Colonial Metals, is being enforced today to the fullest extent pos-
sible.
V. CONTRACTOR'S REMEDIES IN A TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE
In exchange for the privilege of being able to terminate a con-
tract at will, the government agrees to reimburse the contractor
for all reasonable costs of the work performed, the cost of settle-
ment, plus a profit on the portion of the job completed before ter-
mination.5 8 Under a common law breach of contract, the
contractor is entitled to the above plus anticipatory profits.
Originally, under the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of
1917, the contractor was to be entitled to "just compensation" as
determined by the President.5 9 Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court in Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States,60 held
that "just compensation" did not include anticipated profits be-
cause termination for the convenience of the government did not
constitute a breach of contract. The contractor will be allowed
profit on preparations made and work done on the contract, and
any reasonable method may be used to arrive at a fair profit, but
the recovery of anticipatory profits and consequential damages
are clearly prohibited by the regulation.6 1
The court held, in John Reiner & Co. v. United States,62 that fail-
ure to follow the requirements of the termination procedures does
not convert a termination into a common-law breach of contract
75-2 BCA 11,613; United States Optics Corp., ASBCA 18,972, 75-2 BCA 11,603
(1975).
57. FED. CoNT. REP. (BNA) 746 (1978).
58. ASPR 8-701.
59. See note 9 infra.
60. 261 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1923).
61. General Builders Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 246 (Ct. Cl.
1969).
62. 325 F.2d 438, 444 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
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nor subject the United States to liability for unearned anticipated
profits.63 In Manloading & Management Associates, the court
concluded that:
Although the plaintiff is entitled to recover, it is clear that it may not re-
cover lost profits or consequential damages. The subject contract con-
tained the standard 'Termination for Convenience' clause. Therefore the
plaintiff is entitled to recover only in accordace with the 'Termination for
Convenience' clause, and not as if a common law breach of contract had
occurred.64
Frequently, Colonial Metals is cited for the court's holding that
"the contract clause on convenience-termination provides that an-
ticipatory profits shall not be allowed in the settlement of termi-
nation costs." 65
Thus, on a termination for the convenience of the government,
plaintiff would be entitled, in general, to the unreimbursed costs
of performance but would have no claim to anticipated but
unearned profits.66 The right to recover for anticipated profits
arises only if the termination of the contract by the government
constitutes a breach. If the government has reserved the right to
terminate a contract for its convenience and then exercises the
right, there is no breach, and normally there would be no recov-
ery for the profits that would have been made if the government
63. Id. at 444.
64. 461 F.2d at 1303.
65. 494 F.2d at 1362. See also ASPR 8-303(a) (1970).
Interestingly in Colonial the plaintiff ingeniously alleged that the profits were
not anticipatory, but rather fixed and certain, because it had a contract with the
government to sell at a fixed price and a contract with supplier to buy at a fixed
price. The court simply said that, "the profit was 'anticipatory' because it was
unearned, unrealized, and contingent upon the completion of the transaction." 494
F.2d at 1362.
66. G.L. Christian and Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1964); Nolan Bros, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250 (Ct. Cl.
1969); J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1962). In a more
recent case.
A construction contractor who was ordered to perform 'changed work'
which was later cancelled was not entitled to receive profit on the work
not performed because the Changes and Termination for Convenience
clauses prohibit recovery of anticipatory profits. The change in work con-
sisted of the installation of additional water lines on the construction site.
Before the contractor could order materials and commence performance,
the work was cancelled. The Changes and Termination for Convenience
clauses in the contract authorized the deletion of the work and disallowed
recovery of profit on work not performed. However, the contractor was en-
titled to recover "estimating costs" for bid and proposal expenses on the
changed work and obtaining a railroad right of way for the additional
water lines.
Molony & Rubien Construction Co., ASBCA 22,276, 78-1 BCA 13,000.
had not exercised its reserved right.67 Today, the fully developed
policy, as initiated in the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of
1917, clearly shifts the uncertainty of procurement costs to the
contractor.68
By the incorporation of a T/C provision, the government con-
tractor relinquishes, whenever the termination provisions of the
contract become operative, the "anticipated but unearned profits"
portion of the common-law formula for damages in a breach of
contract action. Only profits from work actually performed prior
to termination may be included as damages. 69
VI. LIMITATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF THE
TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE CLAUSE
In recent years, the validity of the government's use of the T/C
clause 70 with federal government contracts in excess of $10,000
has been a recurring issue before the United States Court of
Claims 71 and the Government Agency Board of Contract Appeals,
as well as the subject of a number of legal articles. 72 The limita-
67. 312 F.2d at 423. See also, DeLaval Steam-Turbine Co. v. United States, 284
U.S. 61 (1931); College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12 (1925); Davis
Sewing Machine Co. of Delaware v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 201, 217 (1925), afd
mem. 273 U.S. 324 (1927).
68. See generally, vom Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29 FED.
B. J. 305,353 (1970).
69. See Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Mitchell
& Tracy, Terminations of Government Contracts: Recent Developments, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 817, 864 (1973). But see, North Star Aviation Corp. v. United States,
458 F.2d 64 (1972), a case which occurred after Christian, but in an interesting
manner deviated from the common anticipatory profits prohibition and allowed
the recovery of anticipatory profits by relying solely upon the contract provision.
The contract did not contain a termination for convenience clause. The court de-
termined that the breach constituted common law breach of contract and they
thus allowed recovery based on anticipatory profits. See also, Mitchell & Tracy,
Terminations of Government Contracts: Recent Developments, 14 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 817, 864 (1973).
70. See note 2 supra.
71. See, e.g., Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Emeco
Industries Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 652 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Manloading & Manage-
ment Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1299 (Ct. Cl. 1972); G.C. Casebolt Co. v.
United States, 421 F.2d 710 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 405
F.2d 1250 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Schlesinger v. United States, 390 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1968);
Nesbitt v. United States, 345 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966);
Coastal Cargo Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Brown & Son Elev.
Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1965); John Reiner & Co. v. United States,
325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); Warren Bros. Roads Co.
v. United States, 355 F.2d 612 (Ct. Cl. 1965); G.L. Christian and Assoc. v. United
States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Librach & Cutler v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605
(1959); Line Constr. Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 154 (1947); Davis Sewing
Mach. Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 201 (1925), ajf'd, 273 U.S. 324 (1927).
72. See, e.g. Beauregard, Termination for Convenience as Breach of a Govern-
ment Contract, 7 B.C. INDUST. AND COMM. L. REV. 259 (1966); Brous, Termination
for Convenience: A Remedy for the Erroneous Award, 5 PUB. CON. L.J. 221 (1972);
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tions on this right to terminate are not set forth in either the T/C
clause or in the procurement regulations.
VII. BEST INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT
It is possible that a contractor would not be bound by the gov-
ernment's action if the interpretation of the clause somehow lim-
ited the scope of the right. However, the language of the current
T/C clause, 73 in federal government contracts in excess of $10,000,
is extremely broad, permitting termination when in "the best in-
terest of the government." This language is ambiguous and is not
defined in the government clause or in procurement regulations, 74
nor has litigation clarified the intent of the clause.7 5 For example,
in John Reiner the court held that:
Such termination is authorized whenever the contracting officer shall de-
termine that it is in the best interest of the Government. The broad reach
of that phrase comprehends termination in a host of variable and unspeci-
fied situations calling (in the contracting officer's view) for the ending of
the agreement .... Under such an all-inclusive clause,the Government
has the right to terminate at will.7 6
Apparently any savings at all, monetary, tangible, or intangible,
constitutes sufficient grounds for a convenience termination.77
The contracting officer cannot issue a T/C if not in the "best in-
terest of the government." When a contract is to be partially ter-
minated, the government can issue either a T/C or a deductive
Dygert, Implied Warranties in Government Contracts, 53 MIL L. REV. 39 (1971);
Grossbaum, Procedural Fairness in Public Contracts: The Procurement Regula-
tions, 57 VA. L. REV.171 (1971); Mitchell & Tracy, Terminations of Government Con-
tracts: Recent Developments, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 817 (1973); Perlman &
Goodrich, Termination for Convenience Settlements - the Government's Limited
Payment for Cancellation of Contracts, 10 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 1 (1978); Comment, A
Question of Interest: The Government Contractor v. the United States, 23 A.U.L.
REV. 443 (1973); vom Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29 FED. B.J.
305 (1970); Whelan & Pearson, Underlying Values in Government Contracts, 10 J.
PUB. L. 298 (1961).
73. See note 1 supra.
74. R. NASH & I. CIBINC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW (2d ed 1969).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 442. See also Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl.
201, 217 (1925), affd mem., 273 U.S. 324 (1927); Librach v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl.
605, 611 (1959); Okinawa Climate Control Corp., ASBCA 19,753, 77-2 BCA 12,669
(1977).
77. In Commercial Cable Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 816 (Ct. Cl. 1968) plain-
tiff alleged that the government breached by failing to terminate the contract for
the convenience of the government where the contractor had requested that it do
so. The court concluded that the contracting officer had decided not to terminate
and that his decision was conclusive, regardless of bad faith or clear abuse of dis-
cretion. See also Steinthal & Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
change order. A partial termination order will allow costs in-
curred plus a profit on those costs and will eliminate payment of
anticipatory profits to the contractor. If a change order is issued,
the contract will be reduced by "pricing out" the estimated cost of
the work and allowing an estimated profit. 78 In J. W. Bateson Co.
v. United States,79 the Court held that the basis for determining
whether the deletion was properly a T/C rather than a change is
whether the modification has a "major" or "minor" impact on the
work.80 In Bateson, an order by the contracting officer to a con-
struction contractor to use the government's material instead of a
subcontractor's material was held to be a partial termination and
not a change. A change would have entitled the contractor to
greater compensation.81
VIII. ATrEMPTED LIMITATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT
A. Adhesion Contract Argument
The government contract is an example of that type of agree-
ment known as a "contract of adhesion."82 Its boiler-plate provi-
sions are the result of long experience in the making,
administration, and termination of contracts.8 3 With the classic
adhesion contract, one party, at its leisure, drawing from expert
legal advice, drafts a form contract complete with waivers of
rights and privileges and exculpatory clauses; a court could not
78. R. NASH & I. CIBiNic, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAw, 764 n.3 (1969). See, e.g.,
Celesco Indus., Inc., ASBCA 22,251 79-1 BCA 13,604 (1979); Kakos Nursery, Inc.,
ASBCA 10,989, 66-2 BCA 15733 (1966); Algernon Blair, Inc. ASBCA 10,738, 65-2
BCA 5127 ('1965); Gregory & Reilly Assoc., Inc., FAACAP 65-30, 65-2 BCA 4918
(1965).
79. 308 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1962).
80. Id. at 513.
It is obvious that there can be no hard and fast line between a 'termina-
tion' and a 'change' in the sense of these contracts. By a shift of circum-
stances, the two words may be made to verge on each other, or, on the
other hand, may be made to stand far apart. Anybody would readily agree
that when a contract for 430 buildings is cut down to 81 buildings, there
has been a partial termination, and there would be the same unanimity in
saying that the use of a shingle roof in place of a composition roof on a
house would be a change rather than a termination, yet if a contractor for
a dwelling and basement has the basement eliminated, there would be
borderline picture, and that fairly could be called a change as readily as a
partial termination. The long and short of it is that the proper yardstick in
judging between a change and a termination in projects of this magnitude
would best be found by thinking in terms of major and minor variations in
the plans. Id. at 514.
81. See Principles and Procedures for Terminations, 2 GOV'T. CoNT. REP.
(CCH) 12,075.60 (1962). See also Sutton Constr. Co., ASBCA 8405, 63 BCA 3762
(1963); Seaboard Surety Co., ASBCA 6716, 62 BCA 3407 (1962).
82. See W. KEYES, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PROCUREMENT LAw (1975).
83. Whelan & Pearson, Underlying Values in Government Contracts, 10 J. PUB.
L. 298, 331 (1961).
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treat this as an agreement negotiated and hammered out at arm's
length by equals. A contracting party must voluntarily, know-
ingly, and intelligently waive its rights and do so with full aware-
ness of the legal consequences. The T/C clause may be
disregarded if it is the result of overreaching or of unfair use of
unequal bargaining power.84 An educated contractor familiar
with the procedures of the federal government, should know of
the government's right to terminate a contract in order to con-
serve limited government funds. However, the likelihood that the
contractor did not realize that the government might terminate at
any time for convenience and for reasons outside the contract,
must be considered.8 5
B. Illusory Contract Argument
It does not seem legally valid to say that the mere presence of a
T/C clause in a contract makes the contract void for want of a
binding obligation on the part of the government. One might ar-
gue that contractual promises which are entirely illusory are not
consideration and cannot serve as the basis for a contract.8 6 Al-
though this argument appears sound, the T/C clause in itself con-
tains sufficient promissory consideration to overcome such
challenge. The contract is binding and not illusory, because the
many other promises by the government to the contractor incor-
porated within the clause itself amount to a sufficient considera-
tion.8 7
C. Procedural Due Process Argument
Although ingenious, the attempt to limit the government's use
of the T/C clause as a denial of procedural due process88 has
been unsuccessful. The procedural due process requirement is
84. Following the so called "blue-pencil" rule wherein the court may strike
words from a contract.
85. See Dairy Sales Corp. v. United States, 593 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
86. An "illusory" contract does not obligate the promisor and may allow him
to excuse himself entirely from his promise. "[In any case where a promise in
terms or in effect provides that the promisor has a right to choose one of two alter-
natives, and by choosing one will escape without suffering a detriment or giving
the other party a benefit, the promise is insufficient consideration." 1 S. WIuus-
TON, WnI uSTON ON CONTRACTS, 400 (3d ed. 1957).
87. W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELi, 281 (1979).
88. U.S. CONST., amend. V (1971). "No person shall be ... deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law ......
satisfied by a mere hearing such as the post termination appeal to
the Board of Contract Appeals. In a recent case,89 involving the
termination for convenience of a contract to supply medical serv-
ices, the contractor contended that the termination was improper
because it was the product of bad faith and advance notice of the
reasons supporting the termination were not received.90 The ter-
mination was based on personal as well as professional differ-
ences between the doctor providing the services and the hospital
commander. The Board concluded that, "[T] he termination of a
contract which has given rise to personal and professional differ-
ences between a contractor and government officials, for whatever
reasons, lies within the field of discretion afforded by the Clause.
(Advance notice of the Government's intention and an opportu-
nity to oppose termination not required)."91
IX. LirrATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT
A. Bad Faith Approach
Apparently the only limitation on the government's discretion
in a T/C action is by a clear showing that the termination was in
bad faith.92 In both Librach & Cutler v. United States,93 and Ja-
cobs v. United States,94 the contractor's allegation of bad faith ter-
mination was not shown. In Librach, the Army Quartermaster
General had erroneously directed the contract to be terminated
and after discovering his mistake, directed that the terminated
supplies be reprocured, but shifted the work to another contrac-
tor.
In the subsequent case of John Reiner the court stated that "in
the absence of bad faith or clear abuse of discretion the con-
89. Dr. Javad Hedayaty, ASBCA 22,276, 78-1 BCA 13,151 (1978).
90. Id. at 64,277:
The Board also found that the government by its termination action, was
not commenting upon the appellant's professional performance, since the
termination was not for default. The Board citing Colonial Metals went on
to state that:
Absent either bad faith or some other wrongful or illegal conduct, the
Government alone is the judge of its best interest in terminating a
contract for convenience pursuant to the discretionary power reserved
by the clause to the contracting officer. Abuse of this plenary discre-
tion is cognizable only as a breach of contract action, a legal remedy
beyond the administrative jurisdiciton of this Board.
91. Id.
92. Jacobs v. United States, 239 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
904 (1957); National Factors, Inc. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 218 (1976); Librach &
Cutler v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605 (1959).
93. 147 Ct. Cl. 605 (1959).
94. 239 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1956).
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tracting officer's election to terminate is conclusive."95 In Colonial
Metals the court held that:
[I] n the absence of some proof of malice or conspiracy against the plain-
tiff ... [or in the absence of] bad faith or some other wrong to the plaintiff
or illegal conduct . . . , the Government alone is the judge of its best in-
terest in terminating a contract for convenience, pursuant to the discre-
tionary power reserved by the clause to the Government's contracting
officer.
9 6
Impliedly, the courts have recognized that under appropriate cir-
cumstances an action could be brought for a bad faith termina-
tion.
Practically speaking, the burden of proof required to establish
bad faith is great. The Board reinterpreted "bad faith" in Kalvar
Corp. v. United States.9 7 This case involved a primary source of
supply contract where the contractor asserted a claim of bad faith
and abuse of discretion. The court stated that when considering
"allegations of bad faith, the necessary irrefragable proof had
been equated with evidence of some specific intent to injure the
plaintiff" and "compared bad faith to actions which are motivated
alone by malice."98 The court went on to cite Colonial Metals and
affirmed that "[tihe mere fact that a contracting officer awards a
contract to another company after terminating the plantiff's con-
tract is insufficient to show bad faith."9 The Court of Claims ap-
parently assumes that public officials act "conscientiously in the
discharge of their duties."OO
In James E. McFadden v. United States,lOl the contractor ar-
95. 325 F.2d at 444. See also Line Constr. Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 154,
187 (1947).
96. 494 F.2d at 1361.
97. 543 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Plaintiff was to supply the General Services
Administration with a specific type film. The GSA determined, on the basis of in-
formation supplied by Kalvar and Xidex (Xidex had been a primary source sup-
plier to GSA in the year preceding Kalvar's contract) regarding their own films,
that the films requested were beyond the scope of Kalvar's primary source con-
tract and entered into an additional contract with Xidex. Id. at 1301 n. 1. See also
Librach & Cutler v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605 (1959); Levering & Carrigues Co.
v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 739 (1931); J. MCBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACTS, 5.60 (1965).
98. 543 F.2d at 1302. "Irrefragable" is defined as impossible to deny or refute.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. "[I]n the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed
that the public officials involved in the termination of the plaintiff's contract were
acting conscientiously in the discharge of their duties when the contract was ter-
minated for the purported convenience of the Government." Librach & Cutler v.
United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605, 612 (1959).
101. James E. McFadden, GOV'T CONT. REP. (CCH) §81,819 (1977).
gued that the contracting officer's termination action102 was taken
in bad faith, basing this argument on the meanings of the terms
"good faith" and "commercial reasonableness" in commercial
transactions betwen private parties. The court again restricted its
interpretation of "bad faith" and held, "that neither the con-
tracting officer nor his superiors acted in bad faith, as that phrase
had been defined in connection with the termination actions of
Government officials.", 0 3 The court stated that, "the term bad
faith had been equated with a specific intent to injure and must be
shown with well-nigh irrefragable proof'1 0 4 (emphasis added).
The court briefly reviewed the factual holding of Colonial Metals
and analogized that, "[t] he motivation of the contracting officer's
superiors in the instant case was identical (i.e., a desire to obtain
a lower price)." 0 5 The result of these cases is that no court has
yet found "bad faith" in a convenience termination case. 0 6
Yet another "bad faith" approach was attempted in Legislative
Resources, Inc., 07 brought before the BCA in 1976. This appeal to
the BCA was based upon the allegation that the T/C was racially
motivated and therefore in bad faith. The Board held that it did
not have jurisdiction to consider claims of bias or prejudice. 08 In
June of 1977, in MSG Associates, Inc., the ASBCA stated that it
lacked authority to review an allegation of bad faith termina-
tion.10 9 In citing Colonial Metals the Board decided that:
By the express terms of the contract the Government is given the abso-
lute and unconditional right to terminate the contract for its convenience.
The determination of the interest and inconvenience of the Government
is, by the pertinent contract clause, left exclusively to the discretion of the
Government and its motives in exercising this absolute contract right are
immaterial to our decision. 110
102. "On the same day that the contractor received written notice that it has
been awarded a post office rehabilitation contract, the contracting officer was in-
structed by his superiors to reject all bids as unreasonably priced. Since the con-
tract had already been awarded, the contracting officer ultimately terminated it for
the Government's convenience." 20 G.C. 49 (1978).
103. James E. McFadden, Gov'T CoNT. REP. (CCH) §81,819 (1977).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Kalvar Corp., Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 1976). For a
very recent opinion from the GAO, see Bradford Nat'l Corp., Comp. Gen. D-19479
(1980).
107. DCAB OMBE-16-74, 76-2 BCA 11,951 (1976).
108. Id. at 57,281. See also Midwest Telecommunications Corp., ASBCA 21,541,
77-2 BCA 12,581 (1977) (dealing with jurisdiction where the contractor's claim was
based on fraud priciples).
109. MSG Assoc., Inc., ASBCA 21,753, 77-2 BCA 12, 613 (1977). An allegation
that the government in bad faith terminated a contract for its convenience was not
susceptible of review by the ASBCA because an abuse of discretion in terminating
a contract for convenience is cognizable only as a breach of contract, which the
Board lacks authority to remedy.
110. Id. The Board concluded that:
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In Globe Air, Inc.,ill in March of 1978, the contractor alleged,
before the AGBCA, that the termination of his contract "was arbi-
trary, unjust, unfair and unreasonable and not in the best interest
of the government," and that "the contracting officer's action was
not a good faith settlement"1' 2 of the claims. In its decision, the
Board refrained from expressing an opinion with respect to this
issue due to lack of jurisdiction.'13
Is this the demise of the bad faith doctrine within the Agency
Boards or is it that they do not want to become further entangled
with breach determinations based on unjust T/C's and wish now
to leave the entire issue to the Court of Claims? If the Board was
right in its holding that the housekeeping interest of the Agency
Board in refusing to review a bad faith allegation overrides a
plaintiff-protecting equitable policy, then it appears there is little
reason for a plaintiff to even waste its time seeking Board review.
Thus, a contractor faces the limited choice, under the new Con-
tract Disputes Act of 1978, of having to bypass the Agency Board
and go directly to the Court of Claims.l14
B. Bad Faith Approach Under The UCC
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the federal
courts, applying state law, have been willing to impose a good
Although actions committed to the discretion of procurement officials are
not immune from scrutiny to determine whether that discretion has been
abused, a finding of bad faith or other abuie of discretion in terminating
the instant contract for convenience would be cognizable only, if at all, as
a breach of contract, which this Board lacks the authority to remedy.
Moreover, even assuming the truth of appellant's allegations, there is in-
sufficient basis to overcome the presumption that the officials involved in
terminating appellant's contract were acting conscientiously and without
malice in the discharge of their duties.
111. AGBCA 76-119, 78-1 BCA 13,079 (1978). The contractor, who supplied a
helicopter that had crashed, offered to supply a replacement helicopter of the
same type. The government, however, decided to terminate the contract and to
postpone use of the helicopters until a study could be performed to determine
whether the particular type of helicopter involved was safe. The contractor al-
leged that the termination was motivated by a subjective, wholly unjustified, bias
against the particular helicopter used by the contractor.
112. Id.
113. MSG Assoc. Inc., ASBCA 21,753, 77-2 BCA 12,613 (1971). "The board does
not have jurisdiction to determine what motives caused the Contracting Officer to
terminate the contract for convenience of the Government."
114. The ASBCA has taken the position that it has no jurisdiction to determine
if a convenience termination was applied in bad faith. The action must be brought
in the Court of Claims. Midwest Telecommunications Corp., ASBCA 21,541, 77-2
BCA 12,581 (1977).
faith requirement in unilateral termination cases. 115 The UCC re-
quires the parties to a contract to act in good faith in the perform-
ance of a contract." 6 In De Treville v. Outboard Marine Corp.," 7
the court, in applying the UCC, stated that "[r] egardless of broad
unilateral termination powers, the party who terminates a con-
tract commits an actionable wrong if the manner of termination is
contrary to equity and good conscience.", 18
In order to show bad faith under the UCC, it is not necessary to
prove intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or untruthfulness.
Between merchants it is merely necessary to show that the stan-
dard of "decency, fairness and reasonableness in performance" of
the contract and fair dealing in the trade had not been met.119
Thus, the proof required under the UCC to establish bad faith is
insufficient in a T/C challenge. A successful T/C challenge re-
quires irrefragable proof of some specific intent to injure the
plaintiff. In addition, the Court of Claims and Agency Boards
have looked to the UCC only when there is no federal law on
point. Thus, after Kalvar the applicability of UCC principles may
be of limited utility.
Furthermore, it has not been determined what remedy is avail-
able to a contractor after he successfully proves a bad faith termi-
nation. One can only assume, by way of implication, that a court
would hold that a bad faith termination constitutes a breach of
contract. The terminated party would be entitled to damages for
this breach and presumably his anticipated profits on the entire
contract.120
115. See De Treville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971);
Telecontrols, Inc. v. Ford Industries, Inc., 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967).
116. U.C.C. §1-201(1) (a) defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct of
the transaction concerned." U.C.C. §1-203 provides that every contract imposes
"an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. §2-103
(1)(b) provides that in the case of a merchant good faith means, in addition to
honesty in fact, "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in the trade."
117. 439 F.2d 1099.
118. Id. at 1100.
119. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 668 (1963).
120. In G. L. Christian & Assoc., 312 F.2d 418. 423 (1963), the court said:
If the government terminates a contract without justification, such termi-
nation is a breach of the contract and the Government becomes liable for
all the damages resulting from the wrongful act .... The damages will in-
clude not only the injured party's expenditures and losses in partially per-
forming the contract, but also, if properly proved, the profits that such
party would have realized if he had been permitted to complete the con-
tract. The objective is to put the injured party in as good a position pecu-
niarily as he would have been in if the contract had been completely
performed. The right to recover for anticipated profits arises only if the
termination of the contract by the Government is wrongful and consti-
tutes a breach.
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C. Abuse of Discretion/Tort Approach
One might argue that an abuse of discretion resulting in dam-
ages 2 1 to the contractor might give rise to a cause of action in
tort. However no such cause of action is presently available. The
Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946122 removed the traditional immu-
nities from all tort claims against the government. Section
2680(a) creates an exception to liability under which the govern-
ment retains its sovereign immunity from any claim "based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty" of a federal agency or em-
ployee,123 "whether or not the discretion involved be abused."124
D. Multiple Convenience Terminations Approach
A T/C may be invalid where it represents an attempt to improp-
erly suspend or debar a contractor from government con-
tracting.125 In a very recent situation involving the General
Services Administration (GSA), a contract was terminated for the
convenience of the government because the contractor was im-
pliedly involved in the current GSA "scandals."126 In that case,
the contractor alleged that the cancellation of the contract was an
overreaction to an "endless stream of press articles," and there-
fore "GSA [was) following a pattern of conduct based on defacto
debarment."127 The contractor further alleged that the contract
was terminated for the sole purpose of preventing an award to Art
Metal and was not rescinded for GSA's convenience.1 28 In addi-
121. Damages may be a result of loss of the contract, loss of anticipatory profits,
and possibly some form of consequential default under a mortgage financing
scheme based upon the anticipated contract proceeds.
122. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 & 1402 (1970).
123. As to what types of acts are considered discretionary, see United Airlines,
Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951; 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §29.13 (1956); and W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, §131 (4th ed. 1971).
124. W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL, 149 (1979).
125. Art Metal - U.S.A. v. Solomon, 473 F.Supp. 1, (D.D.C. 1978).
126. Id.
127. FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) A-14 (1978).
128. The company, which had been supplying office furniture to GSA for more
than 20 years, was low bidder on a nine million dollar contract to supply fie cabi-
nets. Within a few hours of the award to Art Metals, the GSA Administrator di-
rected that the contract be terminated for the convenience of the government. The
contractor notes that stories in The Washington Post and The Washington Star
quote GSA officials as stating that they are trying to set up a basis for suspending
dealings with the Art-Metal company and that there could possibly be grounds for
tion, four other GSA contracts were "held in abeyance" beyond
the normal time frame in which they would have been made. The
court ordered that GSA reinstate the wrongfully terminated con-
tract award and allow the contractor to bid, receive, and maintain
contracts under the same standards applicable to other contrac-
tors.129 Thus, a contractor may not be improperly suspended or
debarred from government contracting by use of a T/C.
E. First To File Approach
The Court of Claims has held that the government can cut off
the contactor's right to bring an action for breach of contract by a
T/C, after the breaching acts have occurred but prior to institu-
tion of suit by the contractor. In Nolan the plaintiff argued that,
"where the Government has breached the contract - it cannot es-
cape the normal common law consequences of its wrongful action
by thereafter terminating the contract for its convenience.13 0 The
government has an absolute right to T/C for any reason in the
best interest of the government. This absolute right to terminate
for convenience would allow such application at any stage of the
performance, presumably including a T/C subsequent to initia-
tion of suit by the contractor. In Kalvar, the government failed to
place orders with a competitor. The Court of Claims held that
this was not a breach of contract, but a "'constructive' termina-
tion for convenience, thereby limiting the liability of the govern-
ment for what was an obvious breach."' 3 ' This appears to give
the government the right to cut short any action for such a
breach and so limit the contractor to a T/C recovery.
However, "the Court of Claims has clearly indicated that a con-
tractor who has a valid claim that the government has breached
the contract need not submit to termination procedures - if he can
assert the breach before the government can terminate."'1 2 Ac-
cording to one authority "the contractor might be able to argue
that it had, by filing of the breach of contract action, effectively
precluded the government from exercising any termination power
debarment. Art Metal goes on to state that the vast majority of its business is con-
ducted with GSA and this conduct is likely to put the company out of business.
Id. at A-15.
129. 473 F.Supp. at 8.
130. Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250, 1254 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See
also Dygert, Implied Warranties in Government Contracts, 53 MIL. L. REV. 39
(1971).
131. Perlman & Goodrich, Termination for Convenience Settlements - The Gov-
ernment's Limited Payment for Cancellation of Contracts, 10 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 1, 8
(1978).
132. Dickson, The Effect of Government Breach of Contract Prior to Termination
for Convenience or Default, 11 NAT'L CONT. MGT. J. 125 (1977-78).
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it once possessed."133
X. CONCLUSION
The existing limitations on the application of a convenience ter-
mination are not sufficient to prevent abuse. For example, the
right to terminate at will gives the government "leverage" which
may work to the contractor's disadvantage, as where the contrac-
tor may be merely uncooperative and the government simply
chooses to terminate the contract for its convenience. 134 Exercise
of the T/C power in order to buy elsewhere at a lower price or to
avoid a bad business deal may undermine the competitive bid-
ding system in toto.135
Following Colonial Metals, if the contractor who submits a
timely bid is considered the apparent low bidder136 and is finally
awarded the job, an unsuccessful bidder can subsequently come
in with a new lower price.137 The unsuccessful bidder can merely
challenge the contract award before the General Accounting Of-
fice. The government could allege that the original contract,
based on the General Accounting Office decision, was illegal and
therefore void ab initio. The contracting officer may then termi-
nate the contract and re-award to this lower-priced contractor the
original contract. Presumably, this action would not constitute
Kalvar-type bad faith because it has not been shown that there
was specific intent to maliciously harm the particular contractor.
Even in those instances where it is subsequently determined that
the contract was not illegal, the erroneous cancellation would be
treated as a T/C.138 Thus, although the procurement statutes do
133. Id. at 127-28.
134. See Breed Corp. v. United States, Gov'r CoNT. REP. (CCH) §82,291 (1978).
135. See 16 C.C. 173.
136. As a mere speculation, if contractors are faced with possible early termina-
tions, they would tend to make the early completed items of the job reflect a
greater percentage of the financing and respectively a greater percentage of the
profit. This would enable a contractor to recoup anticipated profits during the
early work items of a project. Naturally, the anticipations raised by Colonial Met-
als would tend to promote "unbalancing" in bids that would be difficult to dis-
cover.
137. Today with the country on the brink of a recession, contractors could show
up at the government's door and offer to take over a contract for a much cheaper
price, merely to assure work for the contractor's personnel.
138. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963). See Comp.
Gen. B-192,941, 79-1 CPD 38 (1979) the Comptroller General held that "Where the
Government's termination decision is based on an alleged impropriety in the
award process, he will review whether the contract award was actually valid and
not usually permit consideration of late bids, the government can
essentially do the same thing by use of a convenience termina-
tion. Therefore, one might argue that "interpreting the termina-
tion clause so broadly [undermines]" the competitive bidding
system and "violate[s] the competitive procurement statutes and
implementing regulations."1 39 The use of T/C in cases arising
from Colonial Metals stretches the "best interest of the Govern-
ment" test to the point of gross inequity.
A federal statute should be imposed upon the courts, such that
the inequities in proving bad faith as required under Kalvar are
avoided without causing the unnecessary waste to the govern-
ment which the convenience termination provisions are designed
to prevent. 40 Yet it is Congress which must decide whether ap-
plication of such a limitation would frustrate federal policy. It is
the author's opinion that a more reasonable bad faith burden of
proof (perhaps as suggested under the UCC) is equitably re-
quired.
If limitations on the use of the clause are not statutorily made,
then in light of the recognized government interest in exercising a
T/C and in consideration of the inadequate protection to a plain-
tiff contractor, the court must exercise considerable creativity in
formulating decisional law. The court must go out of its way to
protect the plaintiff. Professor Keyes has succinctly addressed
this problem in his commentary regarding the "concept of fair-
ness":
The interest of the public is protected in contracting by government at the
federal, state and local levels. Essential fairness to both the public and
the contractor is the keystone of public procurement. Unfair or inefficient
procurement policies and procedures which tend to cause some contrac-
tors either not to bid or to include significant contingencies in their bids
are not in the public interest.
1 41
By striving toward the equitable treatment of contractors, the
government will receive bids that more realistically reflect actual
job costs rather than contain uncertain "plug" price estimates
necessary to take into account the risk of a termination for the
convenience of the government.
LAWRENCE LERNER
proper and he will generally determine whether the termination was justified
under the facts of the original contract award."
139. 16 G.C. 173. In this note case the implication of the Colonial Metals deci-
sion to bidding practices was reviewed.
140. Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1250, 1253 (Ct. Cl. 1969). "Cer-
tainly the Government would not be compelled to see the Contract work through
to the bitter end, no matter what the cost or the trouble or the waste in resources.
Rather, in that situation it would be in the government's 'best interests' to use the
termination clause ......
141. W. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL, 6 (1979).
